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Abstract
In this paper, after observing that different training
data instances affect the machine learning model
to different extents, we attempt to improve the
performance of differentially private empirical
risk minimization (DP-ERM) from a new perspec-
tive. Specifically, we measure the contributions
of various training data instances on the final ma-
chine learning model, and select some of them
to add random noise. Considering that the key
of our method is to measure each data instance
separately, we propose a new ‘Data perturbation’
based (DB) paradigm for DP-ERM: adding ran-
dom noise to the original training data and achiev-
ing (, δ)-differential privacy on the final machine
learning model, along with the preservation on the
original data. By introducing the Influence Func-
tion (IF), we quantitatively measure the impact of
the training data on the final model. Theoretical
and experimental results show that our proposed
DBDP-ERM paradigm enhances the model per-
formance significantly.
1. Introduction
In recent decades, machine learning has been widely used
in fields such as data mining and pattern recognition (Ivezic´
et al., 2019; Kavakiotis et al., 2017; Fu et al., 2019; Fatima
& Pasha, 2017). Although machine learning has been shown
to be effective and powerful in learning meaningful patterns
directly from data, it faces many problems. One of the
widest concerns is privacy, as tremendous quantities of data
are collected to support the data-hungry machine learning
algorithms. Many machine learning models are trained on
crowdsourcing data, which often contains sensitive personal
information (Yuen et al., 2011; Feng et al., 2017), especially
in medical research and financial fraud detection. It is ob-
vious that any leakage of original data will reveal sensitive
information on individuals if there is no protection on the
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training data. However, the original data is not the only
problem, the model parameters trained using this data will
also disclose the privacy of individuals in an undirect way
(Fredrikson et al., 2014; 2015; Shokri et al., 2017).
Differential privacy (DP) (Dwork et al., 2006; 2014) is a
theoretically rigorous tool to prevent sensitive information
leakage and has become a popular framework to guarantee
privacy. It preserves privacy by introducing a certain amount
of random noise to the model parameters, in order to block
malicious adversaries from inferring any single individual
included in the dataset by observing the machine learning
model. As such, differential privacy has attracted the atten-
tion of many researchers and has been applied to numerous
machine learning methods, such as regression (Chaudhuri
& Monteleoni, 2009; Smith et al., 2018; Bernstein & Shel-
don, 2019), principal component analysis (PCA) (Chaud-
huri et al., 2013; Wang & Xu, 2019), Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) (Heikkila¨ et al., 2019), boosting (Dwork
et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2018), deep learning (Shokri &
Shmatikov, 2015; Abadi et al., 2016), generative adversarial
networks (GANs) (Xu et al., 2019; Wu et al., 2019), graph
algorithms (Ullman & Sealfon, 2019; Arora & Upadhyay,
2019) and other fields.
Empirical risk minimization (ERM), a popular optimization
method which covers a variety of machine learning tasks,
also faces privacy problems. There is a long list of works fo-
cusing on the combination of differential privacy and ERM
(Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012; Song et al., 2013;
Bassily et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017),
in which there are three main approaches of adding noise:
output perturbation, objective perturbation and gradient per-
turbation (i.e. adding random noise to the final model, the
objective function and the gradient, respectively).
Besides, input perturbation is an approach to add random
noise on the training data, which is always connected with
local differential privacy (LDP) to protect the individual
privacy when communicating with the server (Duchi et al.,
2013; Zheng et al., 2017; Fukuchi et al., 2017). Addition-
ally, as an important gradient descent method, SGD has also
attracted significant attention for differential privacy (Song
et al., 2013). However, the accuracies of DP-SGD methods
are notorious for being unsatisfactory. Thus, several perfor-
mance improving methods have been proposed for DP-SGD
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(Phan et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2019).
Meanwhile, in previous works, different data instances are
always treated the same when considering privacy. However,
in real scenarios, different training data affects the model in
different ways, so treating them all the same lacks ‘common
sense’ and may be one of the reasons why low accuracy
appears in DP algorithms.
Motivated by the definition of differential privacy (which
will be clarified in detail in Section 2), in this paper, we
provide a new perspective to improve the performance: dif-
ferent data instances are treated differently when adding
random noise in the training process. By observing that
different data instances make different contributions to the
final machine learning model, we set a threshold and select
some of them add random noise to in order to improve the
performance. In particular, we follow the ‘common sense’
and only add random noise to those data instances which
alter the final model parameters significantly, rather than
considering all of them as being the same. To achieve an aim
of ‘measuring each data instance separately’, we propose
a new ‘data perturbation’ based (DB) paradigm in the field
of DP-ERM, guaranteeing differential privacy by perturba-
tion on the original training data. Meanwhile, by adding
noise on the original data, we preserve the training data
to some extents. Additionally, we introduce the Influence
Function (IF) into our method to quantitatively measure the
contributions made by different data instances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we
present some preliminaries in Section 2. Then, we propose
our Data perturbation based Differentially Private ERM
(DBDP-ERM) algorithm in detail in Section 3. In Section 4,
we give ‘performance improving’ DBDP-ERM by consider-
ing the contribution made by each data instance. In Section
5, we present the experimental results. We introduce some
previous work related to our method, such as DP-SGD, in
Section 6. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we revisit the definitions of ERM and differ-
ential privacy, along with some popular perturbation meth-
ods when adding noise.
2.1. Empirical Risk Minimization
In this part, we do not consider privacy. In general, sup-
posing there are n data instances in the dataset in total, the
objective function of ERM is:
L(θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(zi, θ), (1)
where zi is data instance, `(·) denotes the loss function and
θ is the model with m parameters.
In ERM, our goal is to find the optimal θ∗ that minimizes
the objective function, which is formally defined as:
θ∗ = argmin[L(θ)], (2)
and L(θ∗) is represented by L∗.
Assuming zi = (xi, yi), where xi is the feature and yi is
the label, and considering the case of binary classification,
the data space X = Rd, the label set Y = {−1,+1}, and
we assume ‖xi‖ ≤ 1, i.e. X is the unit ball.
2.2. Differential Privacy
Two databases D,D′ ∈ Dn differing by one single element
are denoted as D ∼ D′, and called adjacent databases.
based on adjacent databases, differential privacy is defined
as follows.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy (Dwork et al., 2014))
A randomized function A : Dn → Rm is (,δ)-differential
privacy if
P[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eP[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ, (3)
where S ∈ range(A) and m is the number of parameters.
Differential privacy requires that adjacent datasets D,D′
lead to similar distributions on the output of a randomized
algorithm A. This implies that an adversary cannot infer
whether an individual participates in the training process
because essentially the same conclusions about an individual
will be drawn whether or not that individuals data was used.
2.3. Perturbation Methods
There are three main perturbation methods in the field of dif-
ferential privacy: output perturbation, gradient perturbation
and objective perturbation.
Output Perturbation In the method of output perturbation,
noise is added directly to the final model (in this paper, we
denote a model by its parameters):
θpriv = argmin [L(θ)] + b, (4)
where b is the noise guaranteeing differential privacy.
The output perturbation method is commonly used because
it is simple to implement, only adding noise to the final
model.
Gradient Perturbation In the gradient perturbation
method, noise is added to the gradient when training, which
leads a gradient descent process at round t to:
θt+1 = θt − α(∇L(θt) + b), (5)
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where α is the learning rate.
The gradient perturbation method is feasible and popular
because most machine learning algorithms are based on the
gradient descent method.
Objective Perturbation In the method of objective pertur-
bation, noise is added to the objective function:
Lpriv(θ) = L(θ) + f(b), (6)
where f(b) is a function of the random noise b.
During training, the perturbed objective function Lpriv(θ)
is directly optimized:
θpriv = argmin [Lpriv(θ)] . (7)
This method is rarely used in recent years because it is
always difficult to optimize the objective function with ran-
dom variables.
3. Data Perturbation Based Differentially
Private ERM
In this section, before introducing our performance improv-
ing method, first we introduce our proposed Data pertur-
bation based Differentially Private ERM (DBDP-ERM)
method in detail as fundamental knowledge and provide
a theoretical analysis on privacy and excess empirical risk.
In this paper, when it comes to data perturbation, we trans-
form z = (x, y) to z+b = (x+b, y), where b is the random
noise. The original data is denoted as z and the perturbed
data is denoted as z + b for clarity. With random noise b,
the original data is protected.
As a result, the objective function is transformed to:
Lpriv(θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(zi + b, θ), (8)
where Lpriv(θ) denotes the perturbed objective function.
For generality, we discuss the mini-batch method here. Sup-
posing that the sampling probability is q and the sampled
set is Bt whose size is denoted by |Bt|, i.e. q = |Bt|n .
In this way, the updating of model parameters becomes:
θt+1 = θt − α
(
1
|Bt|
∑
zi∈Bt
∇θ`(zi + b, θt)
)
. (9)
We provide our DBDP-ERM method in Algorithm 1.
By applying Algorithm 1, we can get θpriv to guarantee
the differential privacy of the machine learning model and
Dpriv to preserve the original training data.
Algorithm 1 DBDP-ERM
1: Input: Dataset D, learning rate α, iteration rounds T ,
sampling probability q
2: Initial model parameter as θ0 randomly.
3: For all data instances zi (i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}), transform
them to zi + b.
4: Dpriv = {zi + b}, where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and b ∼
N (0, σ2).
5: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
6: Randomly choose qn samples for gradient descent,
denoted by Bt.
7: θt+1 = θt − α
(
1
qn
∑
zi∈Bt ∇θ`(zi + b, θt)
)
.
8: end for
9: θpriv = θT .
10: return θpriv , Dpriv
Theorem 1 In Algorithm 1, for , δ > 0, if `(z, θ) is G-
Lipschitz over θ, ‖∇x∇θ`(z, θ)‖2 has an infimum I , q is of
the same order as 1|Bt| and
σ ≥ cqG
√
T log(1/δ)

, (10)
it is (, δ)-differential privacy for some constant c.
We provide a sketch of the proof here, details of which are
shown in the full version of this paper. By first order Taylor
expansion at point xi, we have:
θt+1 ≈ θt−α
(
1
|Bt|
∑
zi∈Bt
[∇θ`(zi, θt) +∇x∇θ`(zi, θt)b]
)
.
(11)
For the sake of simplicity, we denote ‖∇x∇θ`(zi, θt)‖2 by
w
(t)
i
1 and transform equation (11) to:
θt+1 ≈ θt − α
(
1
|Bt|
∑
zi∈Bt
[∇θ`(zi, θt) + w(t)i b]
)
= θt − α
(
1
qn
∑
zi∈Bt
∇θ`(zi, θt) + 1
qn
∑
zi∈Bt
w
(t)
i b
)
,
(12)
in which the perturbation is led by 1qn
∑
zi∈Bt w
(t)
i b.
By equation (12), w(t)i ≥ I and noting that b ∼ N (0, σ2),
we have the perturbation on the gradient2:
1
qn
∑
zi∈Bt
w
(t)
i b ≥ Ib = N (0, Iσ2). (13)
1Here, both∇x∇θ`(zi, θt) and its L2-norm (i.e. w(t)i ) repre-
sent how the loss function `(·) scales the perturbation b added on
data, so it is reasonable to replace the former by the latter.
2Note that the ‘perturbation on the gradient’ here does not mean
that we add noise on the gradient; the perturbation on the gradient
is ‘passed’ from the noise we add on the training data.
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With σ in (10), for some constant c, the variance of this Gaus-
sian perturbation is larger than O( q
2G2T log(1/δ)
2 ), which
means (,δ)-differential privacy according to Theorem 1 in
(Abadi et al., 2016).
Note that in Theorem 1, we only assume that the loss func-
tion `(·) is G-Lipschitz, but do not require its convexity. So,
Algorithm 1 is general to most conditions.
4. Performance Improving Method
In this section, we propose a ‘performance improving’
method based on the DBDP-ERM proposed in Section 3.
Motivated by the original definition of differential privacy
(equation (3)), of which the key is the changes on the model
caused by altering a single data instance, we consider the
contributions made by different data instances on the final
model. In particular, if the effects caused by a data instance
z on the final machine learning model is so little that the
attacker cannot realize it by observing the model, there is no
need for us to add noise when training by z. From this per-
spective, it can be observed that DBDP-ERM naturally fits
our method when combining with SGD, in which ‘analyzing
each data instance individually’ is an important step.
Now, we only have one problem left: How to quantitatively
measure the impact of the data instances on the model? A
classic technique from robust statistics, Influence Function
(IF), gives us some inspirations.
4.1. Influence Function
The Influence function, introduced by (Koh & Liang, 2017),
is used to trace a model’s prediction through the learning
algorithm and back to its training data, which can measure
the contributions on the machine learning model made by
data instances.
Formally, the contribution of data instance z is defined by
θ∗−z − θ∗, where θ∗−z = argminθ
∑
zi 6=z `(θ, zi). From
(Koh & Liang, 2017), we have:
θ∗−z − θ∗ ≈ −
1
n
(−H−1θ∗ ∇`(z, θ∗)) , (14)
where Hθ∗ = 1n
∑n
i=1∇2θ`(zi, θ∗) is the Hessian and is
assumed positive definite (PD).
By equation (14), we can quantitatively measure the changes
on the model caused by data instances. In particular, it mea-
sures how the model changes if we ‘drop’ one of the data
instances, which is in line with the definition of differential
privacy. If θ∗−z − θ∗ is small, data instance z contributes
little to the model, so the privacy cost when training with
z is relatively small and vice versa. Based on this observa-
tion, we propose a performance improving version of our
proposed DBDP-ERM method.
Algorithm 2 Performance Improving DBDP-ERM
1: Input: Dataset D, learning rate α, local iteration
rounds Tlocal, global update rounds R
2: Get the analytical solution or pre-trained model θ˜ and
calculate H−1
θ˜
.
3: Initialize the global model θ(g) and the local model θ(l)
with θ˜: θ(g)0 ← θ˜, θ(l)0 ← θ˜.
4: Initialize dataset with privacy: Dpriv ← {}.
5: for r = 0 to R− 1 do
6: for t = 0 to Tlocal − 1 do
7: Choose data instance zt randomly.
8: Calculate contribution built by zt:
ct = θ˜−zt − θ(g)r = − 1n (−H−1θ˜ ∇θ`(zt, θ
(g)
r )).
9: if e− ≤ ‖ ct+θ(g)r
θ
(g)
r
‖2 ≤ e then
10: θ(l)t+1 ← θ(l)t − α∇θ`(zt, θ(l)t ).
11: else
12: Sample bt ∼ N (0, σ2t ), and train the model by
zt + bt, i.e.
13: θ(l)t+1 ← θ(l)t − α
(
∇θ`(zt + bt, θ(l)t )
)
.
14: end if
15: end for
16: θ(g)r+1 = θ
(l)
Tlocal
.
17: end for
18: θpriv = θ
(g)
R
19: Add all (last version) perturbed data instances to Dpriv ,
if there is no perturbation, add the original one.
20: return θpriv , Dpriv
4.2. Performance Improving DBDP-ERM
To measure contributions of different data instances, we
need a (near) optimal model to calculate θ∗−z − θ∗. For
simple tasks, the analytical solution of the optimal model
θ∗ can be achieved; and for complicated tasks, we need to
‘pre-train’ a near optimal model: θ˜.
Then, we set a threshold for adding noise. In particular,
after choosing a data instance z by SGD, we calculate the
contribution of z by equation (14), using the ‘pre-trained’
θ˜3. Then, if the contribution is larger than the threshold, we
add random noise when optimizing with z; otherwise, we
do not add noise.
The performance improving method is detailed in Algorithm
2. First, we define the division between vectors (whose
dimensions are the same) as division on the corresponding
elements, i.e. if a = [a1, a2, ..., ad] and b = [b1, b2, ..., bd],
then ab = [
a1
b1
, a2b2 , ...,
ad
bd
].
In line 9 of Algorithm 2, we measure whether the change on
3For the sake of simplicity, both the analytical solution and
pre-trained near optimal model are denoted by θ˜.
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the model caused by the chosen zt is enough for attackers
to infer an individual or not. If the change is not obvious
(measured by e− and e, the same with DP in equation (3)),
noise is not added and vice versa.
It can be observed that, in Algorithm 2, if the privacy budget
 is higher, the constraint added in line 9 is looser, which
means that less data instances will meet the condition for
adding noise. As a result, the performance of our proposed
performance improving method will be better when  is
higher.
By Algorithm 2, a perturbed machine learning model θpriv
is given, along with a perturbed dataset Dpriv . With Dpriv ,
we can train the private model directly, and the privacy of
the original data is protected to some extents.
Remark 1 In Algorithm 2, the model is changed by each
iteration t. As a result, the contribution ct ‘fluctuates’ with
the model. However, the global model θ(g) is not ‘fixed in
real time’ if Tlocal > 1, which is due to the consideration of
calculation cost, leading ct to be an estimated value during
local Tlocal iterations. If local iteration number Tlocal is set
1, the global model θ(g) is synchronized with the local model
θ(l), which means the contribution ct is the exact value.
4.3. Privacy Guarantees
In Algorithm 2, for those data instances whose contributions
on the final model4 θ(g)r are bounded by e− and e (i.e. line
9 works), (, δ)-differential privacy on these data instances
is naturally guaranteed. So, we only need to consider data
instances that ‘fall into’ line 11.
Theorem 2 In Algorithm 2, for δ > 0 and 0 <  < c1Tn2 , if
`(z, θ) is G-Lipschitz over θ and
σt ≥ cG
√
T log(1/δ)√
wtn
, (15)
where wt = ‖∇x∇θ`(zt, θ(l)t )‖2 (similar to Section 3) and
T = R ∗ Tlocal, it is (, δ)-differential privacy for some
constant c.
Note that in Theorem 2, q = 1n , which is not of the same
order as 1|Bt| (|Bt| = 1), and we release the assumption
‖∇x∇θ`(z, θ)‖2 ≥ I .
Again, we only give a sketch of proof here and more details
can be found in the full version of the paper.
4The‘final model’ is relative, because the model is changed
with the iteration of optimization, which is clarified in Remark 1.
With bt ∼ N (0, σ2t ), we simplify SGD in Algorithm 2 to:
θt+1 = θt − α (∇θ`(zt + bt, θt))
≈ θt − α (∇θ`(zt, θt) +∇x∇θ`(zt, θt)bt)
≈ θt − α (∇θ`(zt, θt) + wtbt)
= θt − α
(∇θ`(zt, θt) +N (0, wtσ2t )) .
(16)
Then, with σ in (15), the perturbation on the gradient when
training with zt is larger thanO(
G2T log(1/δ)
n22 ), which means
(, δ)-differential privacy according to (Abadi et al., 2016).
Remark 2 As can be observed in (15), the noise added to
each data instance is not the same. For data instance zt with
larger wt, less random noise is added. This is because wt
represents how the loss function `(·) scales the perturbation
on data, and the ‘scaled perturbation’ is ‘passed’ to the
gradient. It easily follows that if the scale given by `(·) is
larger, the original added noise will be lower and vice versa.
A comparison between our method and some of the best
previous methods on noise bound is shown in Table 1. As
can be observed, the noise added to data in our method is
much better than the gradient method proposed in (Song
et al., 2013) by a factor of approximately Tn2 and almost
the same as the gradient perturbation methods proposed in
(Abadi et al., 2016) and (Wang et al., 2019).
4.4. Utility
It can be observed that, in Algorithm 2, noise is only added
when training with a partition of data instances that have
a sufficient effect on the model. So, in the worst case,
all training data contributes a lot to the final model, and
as a result, noise is added in each iteration. Under these
circumstances, we analyze the excess empirical risk bound
of our method.
Theorem 3 Suppose that over θ, the loss function `(z, θ) is
L-smooth, the objective function L(θ) is differentiable and
λ-strongly convex, σ is the same as in equation (15) and the
learning rate α = 1L . We have:
E[L(θpriv)− L∗] ≤ O
(
mG2 log(1/δ) log(n)
n22
)
, (17)
wherem is the number of parameters in the model, L∗ is the
same as in equation (2) and T = O˜
(
log( n
22
mG2 log(1/δ) )
)
5.
The proof sketch is similar to (Wang et al., 2017), details
of which are shown in the Appendix. When considering
the worst case, we add noise to the data instance in each
iteration. Here, we denote L-smooth as L and λ-strongly
convex as λ.
5Here, O˜ hides factors polynomial in log(n) and log(1/δ).
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Table 1. Comparisons on noise bound and utility between our method and other methods.
PERTURBATION δ = 0 NOISE TYPE NOISE BOUND UTILITY
(SONG ET AL., 2013) GRADIENT
√
EXPONENTIAL O(G

) NOT GIVEN
(ABADI ET AL., 2016) GRADIENT × GAUSSIAN O(G2T log(1/δ)
n22
) NOT GIVEN
(WU ET AL., 2017) OUTPUT × GAUSSIAN O(G2 log(1.25/δ)
n22
) O(G
2+log(n)
n
+ m
n
)
(WANG ET AL., 2019) GRADIENT × GAUSSIAN O(G2T (log(1/δ)+)
n22
) O(
G
√
G2m log(1/δ)
n
)
DBDP-SGD INPUT × GAUSSIAN O(G2T log(1/δ)
n22
) O(mG
2 log(1/δ) log(n)
n22
)
(PERFORMANCE IMPROVING)
DBDP-SGD INPUT × GAUSSIAN O(
G2T log(1/δ)
n22
)
(FOR THE WORST CASE)
O(mG
2 log(1/δ) log(n)
n22
)
IF THE NOISE TYPE IS ‘EXPONENTIAL’, NOISE b ∝ e− 1λ ‖b‖ , THE NOISE BOUND IS REPRESENTED BY λ.
IF THE NOISE TYPE IS ‘GAUSSIAN’, THE NOISE BOUND IS REPRESENTED BY THE VARIANCE.
By equation (16), the perturbation on data is scaled and
‘passed’ to the gradient by `(·), leading to the perturbation
on the gradient being bt = N (0, wtσ2t ). So, first, we con-
sider the bound of L(θt+1)− L(θt) at iteration t:
E [L(θt+1)− L(θt)]
(L)
≤ E
[
− 1
L
〈∇θL(θt),∇θL(θt) + bt〉
]
+ E
[
1
2L
‖∇θL(θt) + bt‖22
]
= − 1
2L
‖∇θL(θt)‖22 +
1
2L
E‖bt‖22
(λ)
≤ −λ
L
(L(θt)− L∗) + mwtσ
2
t
2L
.
(18)
By re-arranging and summing over T iterations, we have:
E[L(θT )−L∗] ≤ (1−λ
L
)T (L(θ0)−L∗)+mG
2T log(1/δ)
2Ln22
.
(19)
Then, with T = O˜
(
log( n
22
mG2 log(1/δ) )
)
:
E[L(θpriv)− L∗] ≤ O
(
mG2 log(1/δ) log(n)
n22
)
. (20)
Remark 3 By improving the proof process in (Wang et al.,
2017), we improve the last term in equation (19) to
mG2T log(1/δ)
2Ln22 , where the term T in the numerator is T
2
instead in (Wang et al., 2017). As a result, the excess empir-
ical risk bound is improved by a factor of log(n).
It can be observed that for the worst case, the excess empir-
ical risk bound of our method is almost the same as some
of the best previous methods, which means that in standard
settings, our method is much better. Comparisons between
our method and previous methods are shown in Table 1. As
can be seen, our method is better than the methods proposed
in (Wang et al., 2019) and (Wu et al., 2017) by factors of
approximately
√
m log(1/δ) log(n)
n and
log(1/δ)
n2 , respectively.
5. Experiments
Experiments are performed on the classification task. Con-
sidering that the key of our method is to analyze each data
instance individually, we compare it with previous DP-SGD
methods. Specifically, we compare our method with the
gradient perturbation method proposed in (Abadi et al.,
2016), the output perturbation method proposed in (Wu
et al., 2017) and the DP-LSSGD method proposed in (Wang
et al., 2019)6. The performance is measured in terms of
accuracy and the optimality gap. The latter, denoted by
L(θpriv)− L∗, represents the excess empirical risk.
According to the sizes of the datasets, we use both logistic
regression model and deep learning model on the datasets
KDDCup99 (Hettich & Bay, 1999), Adult (Dua & Graff,
2017), Bank (Moro et al., 2014), and on datasets Breast
Cancer (Mangasarian & Wolberg, 1990), Credit Card Fraud
(Bontempi & Worldline, 2018), Iris (Dua & Graff, 2017),
only logistic regression model is applied, where the total
number of data instances are 70000, 45222, 41188, 699,
984 and 150, respectively. In the experiments, deep learning
model is denoted by Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) with
one hidden layer whose size is the same as the input layer.
Training and testing datasets are chosen randomly. Due to
space limitations, the performance on datasets Breast Can-
cer, Credit Card Fraud and Iris are shown in the Appendix.
In all experiments, total iteration rounds T and learning
rate α are chosen by cross-validation. For our performance
improving method, the number of global rounds R is set to
T/10 (i.e. Tlocal = 10). We evaluate the performance over
the differential privacy budget , which is set from 0.01 to
6The performance fluctuates sharply on some datasets.
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(a) KDDCup99 (LR) (b) Adult (LR) (c) Bank (LR)
(d) KDDCup99 (MLP) (e) Adult (MLP) (f) Bank (MLP)
Figure 1. Accuracy over  on different datasets, LR denotes logistic regression model and MLP denotes the deep learning model.
7. δ is set differently according to different datasets and can
be considered as a constant.
Figure 1 shows that as the privacy budget  increases, so
does the accuracy, which follows our intuition. Moreover,
the accuracy of our proposed DBDP-ERM method is similar
to some of the best previous DP-SGD methods. With the
performance improving algorithm proposed in Algorithm 2,
the accuracy rises on most datasets, which means that our
proposed method is effective. Meanwhile, when  is small,
the difference between the accuracy of the DBDP-ERM
method and the performance improving one is also small
and, in some cases, the accuracy of the former is even higher
(e.g. in Figure 1 when  = 0.1). However,as  increases, the
performance improving method becomes more and more
competitive, which correlates with our theoretical analysis.
It can be observed that, in Figure 2, the optimality gap of
the DBDP-ERM method is also similar to previous meth-
ods. Moreover, on some datasets, by applying our proposed
performance improving algorithm, the optimality gap of our
method is almost 0, which means that it achieves almost the
same performance as the model without privacy considera-
tion in some scenarios. In addition, similar to the accuracy
in Figure 1, the optimality gap decreases as  increases,
which follows our intuition.
Experimental results show that our proposed DBDP-ERM
method achieves similar performance to some of the best
previous methods and our performance improving algorithm
significantly improves the performance under most circum-
stances. The results on deep learning models are similar
with traditional machine learning model.
6. Related Work
The first method on DP-ERM was proposed in (Chaud-
huri et al., 2011), in which two perturbation methods were
introduced: output and objective perturbation. A new per-
turbation method: gradient perturbation, was proposed in
(Song et al., 2013), in which DP-SGD was also analyzed.
Based on these works, various other methods were proposed
to improve the noise bound and the excess empirical risk
bound. The accuracy of the objective perturbation method
was improved by (Kifer et al., 2012). The excess empirical
risk bounds of the methods proposed in (Chaudhuri et al.,
2011) and (Kifer et al., 2012) were improved by (Bassily
et al., 2014), guaranteeing differential privacy by gradient
perturbation. (Zhang et al., 2017) proposed an output per-
turbation method, achieving a better utility bound compared
with (Bassily et al., 2014). By introducing an advanced gra-
dient descent method: Prox-SVRG (Xiao & Zhang, 2014),
DP-SVRG was proposed in (Wang et al., 2017), in which
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(a) KDDCup99 (LR) (b) Adult (LR) (c) Bank (LR)
(d) KDDCup99 (MLP) (e) Adult (MLP) (f) Bank (MLP)
Figure 2. Optimality gap over  on different datasets, LR denotes logistic regression model and MLP denotes the deep learning model.
optimal or near optimal utility bounds were achieved, with
less gradient complexity. Besides, input perturbation is an
approach to add noise on the original data, which is always
connected with LDP (Duchi et al., 2013; Zheng et al., 2017;
Fukuchi et al., 2017). In LDP, the privacy of the training
data is concerned, rather than the privacy of the machine
learning model, which is different from our method.
When it comes to DP-SGD, several methods have also been
proposed to improve the performance. An output pertur-
bation method was introduced to DP-SGD in (Wu et al.,
2017), in which a novel L2 sensitivity of SGD was analyzed
and better accuracy was achieved. The moments accountant
method was proposed in (Abadi et al., 2016) to keep track
of the privacy loss and was applied to SGD in deep learning.
Aiming to achieve better performance, (Phan et al., 2017)
added more noise to those features less ‘relevant’ to the
final model, leading to higher accuracy. A Laplace smooth
operator was introduced to DP-SGD when updating model
parameters and a new method: DP-LSSGD was proposed
in (Wang et al., 2019), achieving better performance.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a method to improve the perfor-
mance of DP-ERM from a new perspective: adding random
noise to some of the training data, rather than treating all
of them the same when guaranteeing differential privacy.
In order to achieve our goal, of which the key is ‘dividing
each data instance separately and then measuring them’,
we propose a new paradigm for differentially private ERM:
Data perturbation based DP-ERM (DBDP-ERM), which
adds random noise to the original data and provides (, δ)-
differential privacy on the final machine learning model,
along with preservations on the original data to some ex-
tents. By introducing the influence function (IF), we analyze
the contribution of each data instance to the final model. We
then add noise to the data demonstrating significant contribu-
tions when training, and do not change those whose contri-
butions are small. Through detailed theoretical analysis, we
demonstrate that our proposed DBDP-ERM method, along
with the performance improving algorithm, achieves almost
the same performance as some of the best previous methods
without decrease in privacy guarantees. Meanwhile, experi-
mental results demonstrate that our performance improving
method significantly enhances the accuracy, along with the
excess empirical risk, on both traditional machine learn-
ing models (such as logistic regression) and deep learning
models (such as MLP). In future work, we will attempt to
remove the assumption that the loss function is strongly con-
vex and generalize our proposed paradigm to new scenarios,
such as deep learning.
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